Abstract: This paper addresses theoretically the question how virtual communication may affect cooperation in work teams. The degree of team virtualization , i.e. the extent to which interaction between team members occurs online, is related to parameters of the exchange. First, it is assumed that in online interaction task uncertainties are high er than in face-to-face contacts. Second, the gratifying value of peer rewards is assumed to be lower in online cont acts. Thirdly, it is assumed t hat teams are different in the ext ent to w hich members depend on their p eers for positive a ffections, op erationalized by the extent t o w hich team members are interested in soc ial relationsh ips for their own sake, independently from their work interactio ns . Simulation result s suggest both positive and negative effects of team virtualization on work-cooperat ion.
been undertaken in previous work (e.g. Griffith/Neale 2001), model building has not been formalized nor have underlying behavioral assumptions b een m ade sufficiently explicit to evaluate the consistence of derivation s.
We argue that formal models of semi-virtual teams may help to b etter analyze structural conditions that shape cooperation in teams. Accordingly, we propose a formal model based on social exchange theory that focuses on cooper at ion and informal social interaction in a semi-virtual team. We aim to show t h a t this model can generate plausible hypotheses about the conditions u nder which virtual communication may impede-or sometimes facilitate-cooper a tion between team members. At least one study prior to ours has also proposed a formal model of semi-virtual teamwork (Wong/ Burton 2001) . However, t he m odel of Wong and Burton focuses primarily on the problems t hat team vir t u ality may generate for the efficiency of task completion in a work group. Instead, our model focuses on how virtual communication may shape informal social processes, in particular social control and peer pressure. Informal processes are known from industrial sociology as major mechanisms through which cooper a tion problem s in team work may be resolved 1 (e.g. Hornans 1951 ; Seashore 1954; P etersen 1992) .
In section 2 we discuss from a social exchange p e rsp ective how v irtu al communica tion may affect social control and coopera tion in t eamwork. Section 3 presents the formal mo del. Section 4 uses computer simulation to derive hypotheses. Finally, results a r e discussed and su ggestions for fu ture research are formula ted.
Social Exchange and Coope ration m Se mi-Virtual Teamwork
At the workplace, the problern of coop er a tion in work team s a r ises in t he 'workers' dilemma' wh ether to 'work' or 'shirk'. Workers sh are a comm on int erest in maximizing productivity, if, for example, weak p erforma nce by the firm leads to the loss of jobs, or wages are t ied to production norms by b on us p ayments or group piecerate sch emes (Edwards/ Scullion 1982 , 182) . P a rticula rly in so-called self-ma naged t eams , workers' individ ual payment is often tied t o evalu a tions of group p erforma n ce, for example by group bonuses. Moreover, even without group rewards, employees' ou t puts and thus m onet a ry out comes or career and promotion ch a n ces a re often interdep endent due to orga nization or technology of their work (P et ersen 1992) . C oop eration in work t eams m ay b e problematic, because wor kers face a n indiv idual incentive to ' free ride' by ' shirking' while other s sh oulder t he b urden of maximising t ask p er fo rma nce (Olson 1965 ; Alchia n/ Demset z 1972) . Hornans (19 74) a rgued t h at p eer pressure m ay b e a central m echanism to solve free rider problems. Hornans describes peer pressure as an exchange between group members of compliance with group obligations in return for social rewards, such as 'approval' or affirmation of one's status in the group. Since "some degree of ostracism is the penalty for failing to conform to a norm" (1974, 156) , peer pressure can be an effective instrument of informal social cont rol. The m ore cohesive the group, the stronger the pressure to conform, because a cohesive group is "one in which many members reward one another" (1974, 156) .
Another solution based on social exchange is reciprocity in the work task. In terms of social exchange theory, this is a 'group generalized exchange' (Yamagishi/Cook 1993), in which actors exchange work effort in r eturn for a share of the collective benefit produced by the group as a whole. Even without peer pressure, workers may resist the temptation to free ride in group generalized exchange. This is possible when workers expect that their colleagues likewise pull their weight , but do so only conditionally upon sufficient contributions from others. Then, a worker who is sufficiently interested in future outcomes may refrain from shirking in the present, because he knows that this may h ave the undesirable effect to undermine colleagues' willingness to work in the long run. Game theory has shown that such a solution to free rider problems is consistent w ith enlighte ned self-interest in r ep eated interactions (cf. Fr iedm an 1971; 1986; Axelrod 1984; Taylor 1987; Raub 1988) .
Research on virtual teamwork has identified potential threats to the effectiven ess of informal solutions of the free rider problem. W e use in the following the term team virtuality to refer to the extent to which members of t he t eam work and communicate purely through online m eans. One of t h e major problems for trust in a virtual team may b e t he lower stre ngth of social ties in more vir t u alized teams. For example, Ca proni (2001) states that "high quality relationships may b e particularly difficult to achieve in teams in w hich team mem bers are geographically dispersed". And Griffith and N eale (2001, 397) conclude from a lite ratme review that in more virtualized team s membe rs may feel less psychologically safe and be less likely to identify with the tea m as a salient social referent. In a simila r v ein, Wong a nd Burton (2001) suggest t hat it is hard to build in online communica tion the strong social ties tha t bind team m ember s into a group a nd facilitate mutual confidence a nd reciprocit y. Instead, t h ey argue, the larger the extent to which people interact vir t ually, t he weaker are the social ties b etween them in the sense that ties consist m ainly of instrumental inform ation exchanges but create little social interdep endence b etween team me mbers.
To model the weakness of ties in electronic communication, we assum e t h at the rewarding value of informal r ewards, such as praise and a ppr oval, is lower to t he ext ent that team m ember s communicate mainly vir t ually. However, t h is effect m ay b e shaped by a number of context conditions, su ch as t he gen eral organizational culture, or the degree to w hich firms employ strategies t h a t combine online colla b ora tion with regular offline meetings b etween team m embers. For example, firms may r educe n egative effect s of weaker online ties b y d eliberately creating offline contacts b et ween me mbers of virtual teams (Lipnack/Stamps, 1997) . To capture su ch conditions, our m od el contains a paramet er for the extent to which online communication depreciates the gratifying value of p eer rewards.
A second problern is the higher uncertainty team m embers face ab out others' behavior and intentions in a virtual team. Virtual infor mation exch a nges are much less effective than face-to-face encounters to communicate the social context information through which people get to know and t r ust each other (H and y 1995; Jarvenpaa/Leidner 1999). In particular, workers face la r ger uncertainties about the real reasons why things in the work process may fail or go well. Uncertainty can be a majorproblern for cooperation based on task reciprocit y. Under uncertainty, workers may observe only the results of collea gues' cont r ibutions to a group effort, but these results may be an unreliable indicator of actu al efforts (cf. Bendor/ M ookherjee 1987). The problern for task-recipr ocity is t hat in such situations conditionally cooperative strategies need to impose a t least some retaliation in order to credibly deter group members from free-riding. A s a consequence, 'erroneous' defections caused by uncertainty may severely curtail the efficiency of task reciprocity (Bendor/ Mookherjee 1987; K ollock 1993; Wu j Axelrod 1995) .
To incorp ora te uncertainty in virtual communication into our model, we follow Bendor and Mookhe rjee and assume a n exogenously given error p rob ability tha t is sha p ed by features of the work task of a team. This t ask u ncertainty is scaled with a corresponding model parameter tha t is indep endent of t h e assu med extent of virtualization of teamwork. However, to express t h e lack of social informa tion in v irtual contac ts, we assume tha t in local inter action workers kn ow whether a lack of contribution ca n b e attributed to a mishap or a lack of effort. By contrast, in virtual communication team membe rs only see t h e ou t put bu t not the actual efforts of their colleagues.
Previous research also indicates that weaker ties m ay som etimes facilitate teamwork. Wong a nd Burton (2001) a rgu ed tha t with weaker social obligations, team m embers ca n more readily r eject superfluous information request s from colleagues and thus conduct their tasks m ore efficiently. However, t h e p rob lern ide ntified by Wong a nd Burton does n ot question the pot ential of strong ties to fost er cooperation. On the contrary, the authors argue t h at stron g ties may b e d etrimental for indiv idual efficien cy b ecause they elicit mor e coop eration from team membe rs tha n would b e optimal in terms of task efficienc y. Flach e a nd M acy (1996) go further and challen ge the conventional wisd om t h at st rong t ies ma y always facilita t e social control. In a nutshell, their argu ment focuses at the desire of act ors to obtain social rewards, su ch as affection or a p proval, from other group m ember s. Partic ularly in a closely knit n etwork of exch anges of social rewards, ac tors m ay b e reluctant to sanction d evia n ts who fail to act in the group's interest , b ecause actors fear to loose rewa rds from t hose d evian ts. Accordingly, so t h e a r gument goes, d ep ende nce of group members on p eer approval m ay give shirkers the lever age t o insula te themselves from pr essures to conform. Informal control m ay flow into t h e m ainten a n ce of strong ties at t h e exp e nse of the common good. In this view, the weaker ties in virtual team s may reduce act ors' social dep enden ce on shirkers a nd t hus impr ove conditions for effective informal control.
To integrate in our analysis both positive and negative effects of strong ties, we follow Kitts, Macy and Flache (1999) and distinguish between two forms of social dependence on the team, normative dependence and affective dependence. Normative dependence refers to the extent to which team members n eed behavioral confirmation from their colleagues that they do their work well. Nor mative dependence may for example be high in research a nd development teams where researchers put a high value on their professional reputation. Affective dependence is the extent to which team members wish to be liked by t heir colleagues and want to have pleasant social interactions that are not dependent on task performance. Affective dependence may be high in teams where wor kers lack outside sources of social approval or where work tasks h ave low profession al st atus such that behavioral confirmation can better be gained through socializing with peers than through work effort. We expect that effects of team v irtualization may interact with the primary source of social dependence. In team s with high normative but low affective dependence, virtual communication may mainly limit the effectiveness of peer pressure to perform and thus impede cooperation. In teams where affective dependence is high as compared to n or mative dependence, weaker ties in v irtual communication may prevent t he d ysfunctional prevalence of friendship ties over the work task. To test t he consist ence of these intuitions, we elaboratein the following a formalized model.
The Formal Mode l

Game and Payoff Structure
Team production is modeledas a repeated N-person game in which players take simultaneously b oth work decisions a nd social decisions that have side effects on the payoffs of all other team m emb er s. Actors value group output and approval of their p eers, and they weigh these values against the effort required to obtain them. For simplicity, we w ill d enote in the following all direct a nd indirect benefits that a worker obtains through the gr oup output as the wor kers' wage payment. Wage payment is directly tied to team performance, i.e. the m ore workers contribute to the team effort, the higher the individual payment each of them ob tains. Actors face two decisions: whether to invest in collective effort ('work') and wh ether to invest in their r elationships wit h other members of t h e group ('approval'). To simplify, we assume actors must choose between just two options for each d ecision: to work or shirk, a nd t o a pprove or not a pprove. We refer to the aggregated a mount of work contributions in the gr oup as 'task p erformance' , while the aggregated amount of approval between grou p members is de noted 'group coh esion'. Equation (1) represents the strategy of player i in iter ation t of the r epeated
The symbols i and t in (1) index actors and time, respectively, wand a identify each of the two decisions, work effort and social approval. The work decision of actor i in iteration t is denoted Wit, wh er e Wit = 0 for shirkers and Wit = 1 for contributors. i's approval of j is indicated by aijt, where aijt = 1 when i approves of j and aijt = 0, otherwise. To preclude n arcissism, t h e restrict ion aiit = 0 is employed. Within one iteration, actors take d ecisions simultan eously and independently.
The payoff a team member derives is shaped both b y benefits from wage payment and social approval and by the effort costs that t he worker incurs. Technically, group wage is modeled as a linear function of aggregated indiv idu al outputs, where the maximum wage a worker can earn is scaled by the wage parameter a. For simplicity, we neglect asymmetrical p ositions in the t eam organization and assume that each actor receives 1/ Nth of t he bonus earned by the group, regardless of contribution, where the output of one worker increases the group bonus by one unit.
To include task uncertainty, the model assumes tha t wage paym ent is not a deterministic function of individual efforts. Following Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) , task uncertainty is modeled with a given probability s t h at due to some mishap an individual's contribution fails to be effective (0 :::; s :::; 1) , w here s is equal for all group members. The task uncertainty parameter E reflects the degree of uncertainty t h at is inherent to the particular tech nological and organizational properties of the team task. The occurr ence of a mishap for worker i in iteration t is de noted m it, where m it = 1 ind icates a m ishap and mit = 0 if the effort investmentwas su ccessful. When a mishap occurs, a wor ker still incurs the cost s of effort investment, but the effect of his efforts on t he wage p ayment of his colleagues is nil. Equation 2 formalizes t h e wage p ayment W it that worker i d erives from the outcom e of ite ra tion t of t h e gam e.
The analysis focuses on gam es w ith a Prison er's dilemma structu re, where coop eration in the exchange of work effort is collectively desirable, but actors face incentives to free ride. This implies that loafing is more cost-effective t h an working a nd that everyone realizes a Pareto optimal collective ben efit when ever yon e pulls his weight, or
where c expresses the costs that a worker incurs from on e unit of effort investme nt. Working costs are zero wh en no effort was invested.
The second source of benefit a worker can obtain is p eer a p proval. We assume t h at the rewarding value of informal interactions ('approval') is higher in direct face-to-face inte ractions than it is in purely online communication. Technically, the team comprises two t yp es of team m embers, local team m embers and virtual t eam members. Local team m ember s spend their en tire work day on the local site of their firm, where they h ave physical access a nd daily face-to-face inte ractions w it h all other local team me mbers. Virtual team members have no physical access to their colleagues. They communicate a nd work with all oth er colleagues purely through electronic means. To formalize the access properties of relationships between team members, let li denote worker i's location where li = 1 for local workers and li = 0 for virtual team members. The virtuality of
The social payoffs of a worker are shaped by his location in the team, while local and virtual team members receive the samewage pay ment and are to the same degree dependent on the work input of their colleagues. The effect of virtual communication on social payoffs is modeled as follows. For a worker i, the benefit of being approved of in face-to-face interaction by some oth er group member j (aji = 1) is given by his social dependence ß on peer approval.
We will introduce the distinction between normative and affective dependence further below where we model the way how workers evaluate t heir work behav ior and their approval decisions, respectively. For simplicity, it is assumed t hat all workers are equally dependent on peer approval. A high value of ß models for example that workers live in a company town, where they are h ighly dependent on colleagues' approval due to lack of alternative social contacts outside t h eir work group. Howev er, to express the difference in the rewarding value of onvs. offline social communication, we assume tha t the full r eward value of ß is only obtained when b oth i and j a re local team me mbers (UJ = 1). W h en one of the two parties in a relationship is a virtual team mem ber, t hen for both of them the value of being approved of by their colleagu e reduces to wß, where the para meter w(O < w < 1) refers to the de preciation of the valu e of p eer approval that is due to online interaction. Equation ( 4) expr esses the ben efits from social rewards A it that worker i derives from t he outcom e of iteration t of t h e game.
To include effects of t ask uncertainty, we assume tha t local workers always have perfect informa tion on the true effort investments of all oth er local t eam me mbers in the p ast. By contrast, a virtual team member only k nows the outputs (1-mj)Wj tha t his colleagues j genera t ed in all previous iterations, bu t h e does not know their true effort investments and wheth er a mishap occurred. Correspondingly, the colleagues of a virtual team m ember i also on ly kn ow the output gen er at ed b y i but they a re not aware of i's true effort.
Decision making an basis of reinforcement learning
T o m odel workers' decision making in the r epeated game, we employ a backwardlooking learning mo del t hat assumes t h at actors follow a simple decision heuristic (cf. Flache/Macy 1996; Flach e 1996) . In this model, actor s optimize by learning and adaptation r a ther than by calculating the m a rginal return on indiv idu al investme nt. In other words, actors adjust b oth their effort level and t h eir attitudes toward other m ember s in r esponse to social cues t h at sign al whet her the investme nt was worthwhile. The actors thus influence one another in response to the influence they receive, c reating a complex ada ptive system. Such system s lend themselves more readily to computation al ra ther t h a n a n alytical models (Axelrod 1997 ; for 'backward-looking' computer simulations of collect ive act ion and social exchange, see M acy 1989; 1990) .
The computa tional m od el consists of three basic components: a decision rule, areward function by which outcomes are evaluated as sa tisfactor y or unsatisfactory, a nd a learning rule by which these evalua tions modify ch oice prop ensities. We describe these components in turn.
Decision rule
The decision process is stochastic rather tha n deterministic. Learning actor s follow choice propensities that are altered after they exp erien ce the con sequences of their behavior. The stochastic decision rule assumes t hat each actor i has some propensity P it r epresenting the probability that i will wor k at time t( Wit = 1 ) . With proba bility 1 -Pit, i will shirk (w it = 0). Similarly, p~Jt rep resents t h e probability that i will approve of j a t time t(a ijt = 1). Wit h prob a b ility 1 -p~it ' i will not a pprove of j ( a ijt = 0).
R eward f unction : the evaluation of work and approval
Actors econ omize in our m odel on cognit ive effort w ith t h ree sh ortcut s: r eliance on propinquity as a lowcost proxy for causality, 'satisficing' as a lowcost p roxy for the identifica tion of global optima, a nd separa te evalu ation of decisions as a proxy fo r a n alysis of t h e j oin t effects of simultaneaus actions. Reliance on p ropinquity is mo deled by the 'law of effect ': w hen a n action is associated with a satisfactory outcome then inc rease you r probability to repeat t he action. Conversely, wh en a dissa tisfactory r esult obtains, decrease t he probability t o r epeat the associat ed b eh avior. 'Satisficing' (Simon 1982) implies t h at t h e better the outcome, the m ore likely t he actor will deem it t o b e 'good enough ' r ather than risk a n infe rior result b y searching for som ething better. The p oor er t h e outcome, the mor e likely the actor will b e to take t h e risk. For sim plicity, t h e mo del formalizes this by evaluating outcom es rela tive t o t h e m idp oint of the p ayoff distribu tion. Finally, separa t e evalua tion of actions imp lies t h at actors adap t t h eir p rop ensities to work or t o a pprove sep a rately per decision, based on their satisfaction only w ith some compon ents of the outcom e of t h e pr eceding iteration.
Satisfaction with the work decision increases w ith the act or's share of the tot al grou p wage a nd decreases with the costliness of the d ecision. In addition, local workers always evaluate t h eir local colleagues' t rue effort investment rather than their out put , b ecause even under t ask uncertainty it is seen as su ccess when a colleague tried to cooperate. Moreover, effort is deemed wort hwhile to t h e extent t h at it is associated w it h high levels of approval. M ore form ally,
Sit is i's satisfaction with curren t work effort, such t h a t t h e sign of Sit indicat es positive or negative evaluation. Wit a nd Ait are d efined in (2) a n d (4) above. It is important to note that the effect that others' work has in comparison with others' approval on an actors' satisfaction with his work decision is scaled by the parameters a and ß. These parameters enter equation 5 indirectly via the terms for wage payment, Wit, and approval from peers, Ait, respectively. The (5) is needed to correct for t he difference in the j=l situation of local workers compared to virtual team members. This t erm assures for local workers that not only the outputs but also the true cooperation of t heir local colleagues is taken into account. Se,i is the reference point that determines whether actor i evaluates the outcome of iteration t as success or as failure. For simplicity, we position for each actor the reference point at the midpoint of the range of possible payoffs that this actor can obtain. This imp lies that local team members have a higher expectation level than virtual team members, because local team members can obtain a higher maximal social r eward level than t h eir virtual colleagues. Moreover, in their expectation level team members take the number of local and virtual colleagues into account. Equation 6 specifies the ensuing reference points for satisfaction with the work decision.
The decision by i to a pprove of j, a ijt, is evaluated in t h e same way except that the collective action proble rn is now disaggregated into a matrix of d yadic games, one for each of the possible dyads. Rather t h an taking into accou nt overall group effort and overall a pproval received from t he group, i consider s only i 's b en efit from j's effort a nd the approval received from j . Since i's b en efit when all N me mbers work is a, i's benefit wh en on e individu al j wor ks is a/N.
We use the evaluation of j's approval in our model to incorporate t h e distinction b etween n orma tive and affective dependence of wor kers. Workers can obtain behavioral confirmation from their p eers mainly for their invest m ent s in work effort, b ecause with resp ect to the decision to wor k or shirk all team m embers have a clearly defined common interest in high effort of their colleagu es.
Technically, normative d epende nce is expressed w ith the p aram eter ß in equation (6) t h at scales t he ext ent to which p eer a pproval reinforces an actors' work d ecision.
Affective dep e nden ce r efers to the extent to which t eam m embers wish to b e embedded in ties of mutual social approval ('friendship ties') w it h t heir colleagues, independently from their work b eh avior. A worker 's desire fo r affective rewards can n ot be satisfied by his colleague's obedience wit h collective work norms, but it can b e satisfied w hen the worker r eceives app roval from a colleague in r esponse to his own rela tional investment into t h e t ie with the colleague. Accordingly, we use t he symbol ß' to distinguish affective de p endence from n ormative d ep ende nce ß . Affective d ependence sh apes t h e extent to wh ich a worke r Ego deems it as a su ccess of his approval decision with respect t o a particular colleague Alter, w h en Alter approved of Ego. Like in t h e evaluation of the work decision, a pproval tha t is expressed in online inter action is less valuable to the recipient than approval received in face-to-face interaction, scaled with the online-depreciation parameter w. In addition, we assu me t hat t he working situation always affects at least to some extent workers' social int eractions. That is, Ego always deems it as success of his approval decision when A lter invested in work effort. Finally, the evaluation of approval decisions also takes int o account that local workers ca n see the true effort levels of their local colleagues a nd take these true efforts as basis for success or failure of their own a pproval d ecisions. In this, the aggregate benefits Ego obtains in his relationship with Alter are evaluated against the relationship-specific expectation or r eference point s~,i{ According to (5) and (7) With ß > ß' = 0, they ev en give a pprov al exclusively in response to t h e effort d ecisions of their p eer s. Finally, with ß = ß' > 0, actor s make t h eir approval d ecisions contingent on b oth work b e havior and rela tion al investmen ts of t h eir p eer s, a situation in which social interactions in the group a re rela ted to b ot h w ork and social ties. We exclude the possibility tha t relational de p end en ce exceed s n ormativ e dependence (ß < ß'), because this seems impla usible fo r the situation of a professional team w he re wage p ayme nts a r e based on collective work output.
s~,ij ' finally, is the r elationship-sp ecific reference p oin t that corresponds to the midpoint of the reward distribution in the evaluation of a pproval. Again, the maximum satisfaction that can b e obtained in a rela tionship b etween two local w orkers is highe r tha n in a rela tionship with a t least one v ir t u al t eam member. Equa tion (8) (9) where r is a lea rning parame ter that scales the magnitude of reinforcement and Bmax,i is the highest p ossible absolute value that the wor ksatisfaction Bit can take for worker i. Analogously the reinforcer R~jt for the a p proval decision is obtained as follows
Bmax,ij (10)
Learning function
The final component of the mo del is the lea rning funct ion by wh ich p ropensit ies to work and approve a r e modified by satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the outcomes associated with those behav iors. The learning fu nction is ada pted from a conventional Bush-Mosteller stochastic lea rning model (B ush/ Mosteller 1955) . Actor i's propensity to work, Pit' is reinforced w hen effor t seems to pay (wit = 1 a nd Bit > 0) or when shirking is costly (wit = 0 and B i t < 0):
The b enefits of hard work and the costs of free-riding are indicated in t h e equ ation by two adjustments to Pit , one p ositive (wh en Wit = 1) and the ot her nega tive (when Wit = 0). Hen ce, the r eward to worke rs is add ed t o t h e pr opensity w h en Wit = 1, while the penalty for shirke rs is subtracted when Wit = 0, causing the propensity to increase in either case. Conversely, if feck less beh avior pays off or h a rd work is sucke red, then the prop en sity to shirk (1 -Pit) is reinforced, i. e., 1 -P it is substituted fo r P it on both sides of the equation and 1 -Wit is substituted for Wit, giving (12) The p ropen sity for a pproval P~jt is modified in the sa m e way. If aijt = 1 and Bfjt > 0, or aijt and Bfjt < 0, t h en:
Conversely, if aijt = 0 and Bfjt > 0, or aijt = 1 a nd B fjt < 0, then: (14) T h e t erm s that moderate the effect of the r einforcement, (1 -p) in equations (11) and (13) and p in equations (12) a nd (14), assure t hat prop en sities remain w ithin the valid range [0 .. 1]. This implies in particula r t h a t learning curves t end to flatten wh en the sam e action is repeatedly r ewarded (B > 0) or r epeatedly punish ed (B < 0) and propensities a pproach their limit . However, w it h the high learning ra t es that we choose for our simulation experiment s (see b elow), this does n ot imply inertia in the learning process. P articularly in the r egion close to the boundaries, learning is highly sensitive to adver se ex perience. T h e higher the propensity for a certain action, the stronger is t he effect tha t n egative reinforcement (S < 0) has on the corresponding propensity. Conversely, the lower the propensity for a certain action, the stronger is t h e effect t h a t positive reinforcement (S > 0) h as.
Results
We use simulation expe rime nts to explore the three m ech anisms t hrou gh wh ich virtual communication ma y sha pe the performance of work team s, t ask un certainty, norma tive tie strength and affec tiv e tie strength. In all simulation exp eriments, we va ry systema tically the level of average team v irt uality V of team s of 10 members (N =10) from purely local tea m s (V = 0) to purely virt ual tea m s (V =1) , in steps of 0.1. More precisely, the simulations use 100 replications per level of virtuality, whe re V indicates the proba bility that a p art icula r team me mber is a v irtual member. Per level of team v irtuality, we m easure the level of coop er ation as the a ver age prop en sity in iter a tion 1000 of a t eam memb er to w ork h a rd (w = 1). Furthermore, we use in all simulations t h e starting conditions tha t the maximum wage is fixed at unity (o: = 1) , workers are in itially indifferent b et ween working a nd shirking (Pw = 0.5) as well as b etween a p proval and shu nning in all dyadic r elationships ('Äjo = 0.5, i 'I j). T h is indifference m ay seem a r ather p essimistic assump tion, as ther e is r a rely a comp any where on average only h alf of the employees work. However , we believe initial indifference is an appropriate st a rting assump tion for our a nalysis, b ecause we want to explain h ow worker s learn to coop erate ra ther than assume that cooperation has been est a blished from the outset. Mor eover, as M acy (1 989) sh owed, t h e equilibria to w hich the stoch astic learning mo del converges in the long r unarerobust against varia tion of init ial prop en sities w it hin a large r a nge. F inally, we assum e t h at all w orkers h ave a learning ra te of r=0.75, a condition t hat m akes beh avioral r esp on ses su fficiently flexible to allow the eme rgen ce of stable cooperation through random coordination (cf. Flach e/ M acy 2002) .
Simulation experiment 1: the interaction of task uncertainty and team virtuality
Task uncertainty may undermine trust a nd thus coop e ration between team m ember s, a n d v irtual communication m ay even exacerbat e the trust problems genera t ed by t ask uncertainty. P articula rly in t eams wh ere task un certaint y may result in unintended failures b y members to deliver t heir contr ibu tions to t h e wor k task, colleagu es may more readily interp ret this as a d eliberate free riding a nd, as a consequ en ce, withhold their ow n efforts for t h e gr oup task. To test wh ether our model can rep roduce this exp ect ation, we simulat ed a team sit uation in which cooperation based on mu tual reinforcemen t is p ossible but n ot triv ial in a purely local team. For this, we assumed t hat costs of effort are mor e than tw ice as la rge as the m arginal indiv idual gains of a work contribut ion (c = 0 .25 > 1/N = 0.1) . To focus on effects of virtu al communication on pure task reciprocity, we set both normative and affective dependence to zero and thus excluded social pressure (ß = ß' = 0). Finally, to explore the interaction of team virtuality with task uncertainty, we varied task uncertainty between low (s = 0.01), medium (s = 0.05) and high (s = 0.10). Figure 1 shows the results. F igure 1 confirms 2 the expected interaction between t ask uncertainty and t eam virtua lity. The simulation paramet ers are tuned such tha t in a purely local team (V =0), task reciprocity can sustain an average cooperation rate in iteration 1000 of about 70%. From this starting condition, increasing team virtuality r educes cooperation rates downto about 40% in a fully virtua l team under high task uncertainty. The negative effect of t eam virtuality is somewhat weaker under medium task uncertainty, with a decline from 70% cooperation to about 50%, and it is hardly discernible in teams with low task uncertainty. The underlying reason is the distortion of cooperative equilibria when task uncertainty makes intended coop era tions fail. To explain, previous simulation studies with the same learning model and similar starting conditions showed that without task uncertainty, cooperation will sooner or later emerge and stabilize through random coordination of a critical mass of contributors. With the parameters underlying Figure 1 (N = 10, o: = 1, a nd c = 0.25) , the only stable equilibria of the individua l learning processes are situations in which seven or more team members work. Only then all team members, including shirkers, can be satisfied with their work decisions a nd their learning curves will st abilize on the corresponding outcome after a sufficient number of repetitions ( cf. Macy /Flache 2002).
Task uncertainty can distort equilibria of the learning process. M oreover, the likelihood and frequency of such distortions increases with team virt uality. When for some worker a mishap occurs, this reduces for all v irtual colleagues the satisfaction with their work decision, because they interpret the lack of contribution as a defection. Moreover, when it was a virtual worker who failed, then also all his local colleagues interpret the failure as a defection. Thus, even when everybody is satisfied because there are seven or m ore contributors, the expected share of team members who may become dissatisfied with t heir work decision after some unintended defection is V+ (1 -V) V, a number that increases with team virtuality V. The learning mechanism implies increased likelihood for behavioral change after dissatisfaction. After a mishap, the majority of team members who work hard may at least temporarily reduce their propensity to work and explore defection. After a while the critical mass of contributors may be restored and stabilize, until the next distortion occurs. This explains the interaction effect in figure 1 . The larger the probability of u nintended defections (task uncertainty) and the larger the share of team members who become dissatisfied after such a distortion (team virtuality), t he more likely it is t hat emergent cooperation may collapse temporarily, or even fail to stabilize at all when task uncertainty b ecomes too large.
Simulation experiment 2: the interaction of online-tie strength and team virtuality without affective dependence.
A common argument in the study of virtual teams is that t rust may be fostered by d eliberate offiine meetings that increase the strength of ties b etween t eam members who otherwise interact only online. In terms of our model, such policies reduce the extent of online depreciation w of the value of p eer approval. To test whether our model can replica te the exp ected interaction b etween offiineembeddedness of virtual communication and team virtuality on cooperation, we adapted the starting conditions of simulation exp erime nt 1 suchth at cooperation is much harder to attain without social control. For this, we incr eased t he costs of effort to one third of maximum wage, i.e. c = 0.33, as comp ared to on e four t h in experime nt 1 (c = 0 .25) . To t est wh ether peer pressure is needed in this n ew scenario, we kept all oth er conditions equal to experiment 1 and simulated the cooperation rate in the fully local team (V = 0). As exp ected, the cooper ation rate dropped to 34.2% from the level of a bout 75% shown in figure 1.
We created a situation in which informal social control can consider ably improve cooperation between team members in offiine interaction. Based on previous work we assumed that the n ormative reward value of a unit of approval is a bout twice as large as the ma r ginal benefits of a work contribution (cf. Flach e/M acy 1996), i.e. ß = 0 .2. To foc us further more in this simu lation exp e rime nt on the m otivational asp ect of interpersonal relationships alone and let aside informa tion exchange, we assumed that task uncertainty plays no role in the simulated team (s = 0). Our main interest in this experiment is the p otential of social r ela tionships to mediate informal social cont rol. Accordingly, we n eglect the possibility tha t ties may b e used for the mere production of p os-itive affections and assume zero affective dependence, i.e. ß' = 0.0. All other assumptions are equal to those used in simulation experiment 1.
To test the interaction of offline-embeddedness with team virtuality, we varied the online-depreciation of tie strength w between low, medium and high depreciation, where a unit of approval received in online communication has 75%, or 50%, or 25% of its rewarding value in face-to-face interaction, respectively (w = 0.75,w = 0.50,w = 0.25). Figure 2 below shows the results. Figure 2 shows a cooperation rate of about 80% in a fully local team (V = 0), where all social ties have their full strength (w = 1) by definition. Social control more than doubled the cooperation rate as compared to the benchmark simulation that we conducted without normative dependence (ß = 0.0) and otherwise equal conditions. But figure 2 also shows that team virtuality undermines social control. At all three Ievels of the depreciation of tie strength, the cooperation rate considerably declines with the degree of team virtuality. When online ties have 75% of the strengthofoffline ties (w = 0.75), cooperation drops from the rate of 80% in fully local teams (V = 0) to about 60% in fully virtual teams (V = 1). As expected, the decline is much sharper when online ties are weaker relative to offline relationships. With w = 0.50, the cooperation rate in fully local teams exceeds that of fully virtual teams by about 45% and with w = 0.25 this difference is even somewhat !arger.
To understand how weaker ties erode social control in the learning model, consider Flache/Macy's (1996) explanation of why social control effectively sustains cooperation in the absence of virtual communication. Like in experiment 1 in the fully local team, cooperation is achieved through a self-reinforcing learning dynamic where actors' random search generates by chance an outcome that satisfies all group members with all their decisions. There is only one way how all group members can be simultaneously satisfied with both t ypes of d ecision s in a fully local team under the parameters used in experiment 2. T his is w hen everyone works hard and all group members approve of their peers. If some group member ta kes it easy in his work, t he n all others will remain dissatisfied with their approval decision wit h resp ec t to the shirker a nd keep ch a nging their approval behavior. As a consequence, t h e shir ker will sooner or later experience low levels of approval and b e d issatisfied wit h h is corresponding work decision. This, in turn, leads shirkers to change t h eir work behavior so that at some point group members coordinat e on the equilibrium of hard work combined with mutual approval. The level of 80% cooperation in fully local teams (V = 0) in figure 2 indicates that in iteration 1000 t his point has on averagenot yet been reached for 20% of the group me mbers. H owever, further simulation tests confirmed that the cooperation rate always increases u p to 100% after a sufficient number of iterations (typically a bout 5000) .
The larger the proportion of weak online ties, and the wea ker t hese ties are as compared to face-to-face contacts, the more this may change t h e dynamics of backward-looking social control. For all group members, high er levels of team v irtuality r educe the b enefit s from social rewards t hat actors can obtain in the evaluation of their w ork decisions (equation 4). For local team members, the a pproval of their v irtual colleagues becomes less valuable, a nd for v irtual team m embers it is the approval of every other team m ember t hat is less h ighly regarded. This also reduces actors' corresponding expectation level. As a conseque nce, the higher the degree of tea m v irtuality, the sm aller t he impact t h at changes in the a mount of a pproval for a n actor can h ave on the actor 's satisfaction with his effort investments . In other words, t eam virt u ality red uces the power of the group to make worker s satisfied and shirkers dissatisfied wit h t h eir effort investments. This effect is particula rly strong for virt ual gr oup m embe rs . To b e sure, t eam virtuality d oes n ot ch a nge the b asic assu mption in experiment 2 that a pproval decisions a re consider ed b y ever y actor as d issatisfactory as long as they are directed t owards a shirker. However, t eam v irt uality makes shirkers less v ulnerable to social pressures. In p a rticula r , t h e la r ger t he prop ort ion of weak v irtual ties, the larger is the possible number of shirkers wh o m ay b e shunned by most or even all of their colleagues, but who still rem ain satisfied w ith their shirking b ehavior. They remain satisfied, b ecause they put much more w eight on the wage b enefits gen er a ted by their working colleagues t h an on t h eir loss of social st atus in t he gr oup. This explains why in figure 2 cooperat ion rat es consist ently d ecline w ith increasing t eam v irtuality and why t his effect b ecom es stron ger when online ties b ecom e rela tively wea ker.
Simulation experiment 3: the interaction of online-tie strength and team virtuality with affective dependence.
In the third simulation experiment we tested how t eam virt uality m ay inter act w it h the negative effect of stron g ties proposed by Flache/ M acy (1996) . T h e p ossible weakness of stron g ties identified by Flache and M acy su ggest s a n inter esting n ew p ossibility for the effect s of v irt u al commun ication on cooper ation on work teams. Greater social distance of online interactions may avoid possible negative effects of social cohesion in those teams where members are highly affectively dependent on their peers. As a consequence, weaker t ies in online interaction may promote cooperation in the work task, because they m ake it harder for affectively dependent team members t o be satisfied by social cont acts alone.
To t est this argument, we adapted the conditions of simulation experiment 2 such that without affective dependence cooperation can thrive even in virtua l teams. For this, we reduced the costs of work effort to c = 0.15, a Ievel at which the group faces a moderate social dilemma. Furthermore, we kept the assumption of experiment 2 that normative pressure is a powerful motivator (ß = 0.2), but online communication considerably reduces tie strength both normatively and affectively (w = 0.25). Finally, to test how affective d ependence may change the effects of team virtualization, we varied affective dependence ß' between a low, medium and high Ievel, where the high Ievel corresponds to a situation in which affective rewards are valued equally to normative rewards, while at the low Ievel affective rewards are only 25% as valuable as normative rewards. That is, we used in the simulations ß' = 0.05,ß' = 0.1 and ß' = 0.2, respectively. All other conditions were kept equal to simulation experiment 2. Figure 3 shows the results. The negative effect of team virtuality under low affective dependence in figure   3 is generated by the same mechanism that shaped the negative effects of V displayed in figure 2 . In a fully local team and with affective dependence much lower than normative dependence (ß = 0.2 = 4 * ß'), the unique equilibr ium in which all players can be simultaneously satisfied with their work decisions and their approval behavior remains the state of universal cooperation a nd unive rsal mutual approval. Just like without affective dependence, t h e learning process sooner or later converges on this equilibrium. Furthermore, as team virtuality increases, both normative and affective rewards loose their gratifying value in an increasing proportion of relationships in the team, and social control becomes less effective as a solution to the free rider problem.
When affective dependence exceeds the criticallevel of ß' = 0. 1, social contr ol is even in fully local teams no longer effective. Equations 7 and 8 imply t hat now new equilibria in the learning mechanism arise in which all gr oup m embers can b e satisfied with their approval decisions as long as approval is r ecipr ocated, regardless of the work effort of their colleagues. At t h e same time, universal mutual approval undermines the n eed to work, due to t he still h igh nor mative value of peer approval, ß. With sufficient affective dependence, this peer approval ma y now in equilibrium also be given to shirkers. On the other side, wit h ß = 0.2, sufficient approval can make both workers a nd shirkers b e satisfied with t h eir work decision, even when most group members fail to contribute. F igure 3 shows the consequence of this, the level of only 40% cooperation in a fully local team with high affective a nd normative d ependence (ß = ß' = 0 .2), as com p ared to almost 100% cooperation in a fully local t eam with low affective depend ence (ß = 0.2, ß ' = 0.05). In this condition, an increasing level of team v irt uality fost ers rather tha n undermines cooperation. The reason is t h at w ith sufficient online-deprecia tion of tie strength, m ere mutual a pproval is n o lon ger enough to satisfy group me mbers with their online social relations with shirkers. As a consequence, as time virtuality rises, an inc reasing proportion of t h e group is required to work ha rd b efore the learning process obtains a n equilibrium state in w hich all members can b e satisified with b oth work and approval d ecisions . As figure 3 exemplifies, this results in a p ositive effect of t eam v irt uality on cooperation rates in those conditions wh ere affective d ep enden ce is m edium or high.
Discussion and Conclusion
We h ave proposed in this paper a formal model of the effects of v irtu al teamwork on trust a nd coop er a tion in a team. With this, we move beyond the existing litera tme in the field that is mainly based on case studies or employs theoretical arguments that lack explicit deductive model building. Our model incorporates three mechanisms identified in previous research t h at may underlie effects of team virtuality on cooperation at the workplace, lack of social context information in virtual communication, weaker ties in online interaction and lower affective dependence of team members on peer a p proval in weak on lin e relationships.
Computer simulations revealed conditions tha t interact with t he effects of increasing team virtuality. Our m odel implies tha t task un certainty greatly exacerbates the negative consequences of lack of social context inform ation on trust and thus cooperation between team members. Moreover, t h e simulations suggest that negative effects of the weakness of ties in on line communication on informal control may b e reduced when companies adopt p olicies t hat redu ce the extent to which online interaction depreciates the gratifying value of p eer rewards. This formal result replicates the emphasis that the liter ature puts on the need to flank virtual teamwork with regular offiine m eetings b etween team members. Finally, our analysis suggests a new hy poth esis not r ecognized by previous research. Particularly in primarily local team s, social cont rol may badly fail t o sustain cooperation when team members a re overly dependent on t h eir peer s fo r affective rewa rds, such as frie ndship relations. In su ch team s, high er v irtualization of teamwork may facilita te cooperation, b eca use with weaker t ies workers a r e less prone to tolerate free riders for the sake of m ain taining t h eir social relations with them.
We b elieve tha t testing implications of our theore tical work may b e a fr uitful d irection for exp erimental research on effec ts of v irtual team work. Flach e (1996) used a n experimental exchange game w ith v irtual communication b etween participa nts to test the hypothesized negative effects of bilateral exchange relations on collective good production. The exp erimen ts showed t h at such nega tive effect s mainly occur w h en subjects have rela tively low int erest in h igh team p erformance. Future exp erime nts may test wh eth er t his effect int eracts w ith the extent to w hich commu nication between p layers is virtual. Negative effects of v irtual communication may mainly sh ow up in teams where incen tives to cooperate a re high , but v irtual communication m ay h elp t o r educe free rid er effect s w he n incentives a r e low. In a similar way, the conjecture derived from our simulations may be tested t h a t t eam virtuality can have posit ive effects on cooperation wh en affective d ep endence of tea m m ember s is h igh. To do this, exp e rime nts could directly manipulate affective dep endence t hr ough variation in priorprivate exposure of subj ects to each ot h er. Another p ossibility is t o use est a blished m easurem ent instruments from p ersonality psych ology to measure prior to a n excha n ge exp eriment p ersonality traits of subjects that affect t h eir n eed for p eer approval.
Our study employs a number of simplifying assumptions t h a t prevent us from modeling the full richness of p ossible m ech a nisms thr ough which virt ual communication m ay shape t eamwork. We assume in particula r homogeneity of team members, while the literature p oint sou t that d iversity in skills and backgrounds is particula rly high in geogra phically d isp er sed v irtual teamwor k (Griffit h / Neale 2001). M oreov er , a v irtual team ofte n consists of employees in different or ganizationallocation s or d ep a rtments, with different skills a nd b ackgr ounds, who work together for a specific task (see e.g. Jarvenpaa/Leidn er 1999). In it s present form, our model does not represent this situation well. Instead, it r ather matches the situation of one local team with a number of isolated external m embers who can only communicate via electronic means. However, our a p proach can be readily extended to include heterogeneity of team m embers, for example in terms of their dependence on peer approval and their capability to contribute to the team task. This can be clone in particular by modeling a production function in which each team member needs to make his specific contribution to the common effort and each team member has different opportunity costs of effort that reflect specific demands from the tea m members' own 'hom e' d epartment.
Another weakness of our study is that we have only insufficiently explored the parameter space of the model and the possible interactions effects between the three mechanisms we addressed. In particular, in order t o com plete our simulation study, it would be necessary to test whether t he positive effects of team virtuality that we found for affective dependence would remain w hen the team also faces task uncertainty. We expect that task uncertain ty combined with affective dependence may generate a tipping point in t h e effects of team virtuality on cooperation. It seems plausible that this tipping point arises from a combination of the negative effects of t eam virtuality under task un cer tainty, shown in simulation experiment 1, and the positive effects shown in experiment 3 in the conditions with high affective dependence. Such a n on-linear interaction effect would clearly b e a new and innovative hypothesis in t he field. Future research may show whether the model proposed in this pap er is consisten t with this intuition. In any case, we believe to have d emonstra t ed t h a t a form alized model of semi-virtual teamwork can both r eplicate findin gs from previous empirical work and generate new t est a ble hypotheses tha t gen er alize beyond a sm all number of case studies.
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